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Accounting manipulation is a current problem, reported in many different contexts. 
Several audit quality studies indicate that there is a relationship between the quality of the 
audit and the manipulation of the results. These also show that accruals reduce when the 
auditor is independent or the audit company is large, and suggest that Big 4 Audit Firms 
present higher levels of audit quality, when compared with other companies. The aim of 
this paper is to examine if there is a relationship between the manipulation of results and 
the quality of the audit, based on the study of the behavior of discretionary accruals in 
Portuguese non-listed companies. Collected on the SABI (Iberian Balance sheet Analysis 
System) database, the sample is composed of 4723 companies from 2013 to 2015. The 
empirical model of this study consists of a multiple linear regression in order to explain 
the relationship between the discretionary accruals and the firm size, debt, volume 
business and profitability, based on the Modified Jones Model. The results suggest that 
there is a relationship between audit quality and earnings manipulation. The level of 
earnings management is significantly lower among companies contracting a Big 4 audit 
firm, as compared to companies using a non-Big 4 audit firm. 
 
Keywords: Audit Quality, Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Management, Audit Firm 
Size (Big 4 or non-Big 4) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last decades, companies and investors have been exploring investment 
opportunities, largely due to the globalization of capital markets, international 
cooperation among countries and increased international trade. The impact of 
globalization on the world economy brought changes in companies, which 
faced new challenges and constraints since markets are broader, more volatile 
and competitive. The constant evolution of markets and aggressive competition 
motivates managers to use manipulation practices to influence accounting 
results in order to reflect a better picture of the economic and financial situation of 
companies. Generally, this is achieved by taking advantage of the flexibility of 
accounting standards, or even by non-compliance, by modifying financial 
information. 
With the emergence of financial scandals from a number of companies, 
such as Enron, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Xerox and WorldCom in the United 
States and Ahold, Adecco and Parmalat in Europe, the independence of the 
auditor, the role of the external auditor in the company and consequently the 
quality of the audit were called into question (Bekiris and Doukakis 2011). For 
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the external auditor, an independent body that issues opinions on accountability 
documents and on which users rely for decision-making, there is an increased 
need for independent audits of financial statements that inspire confidence and 
guarantee the reliability of financial information. 
In response to these needs, there are studies that warn of risk behaviors and 
their motivations that lead to these deviant attitudes on the part of managers 
and administrators by causing accounting fraud, with consequences not only 
for the company itself, but also for potential investors and other stakeholders (Al-
Rassas and Kamardin 2016, Becker et al. 1998, Hsu and Wen 2015, Tsipouridou 
and Spathis 2012). Such studies have contributed to understanding the nature, 
purpose, and implications of earnings management, which may be acceptable 
through the flexibility of accounting rules. These permit the adoption of 
accounting policies that allow managers to anticipate or delay the results in the 
desired direction, without breaking accounting law.  
This problem was also studied by some researchers in Portugal (Mendes 
and Rodrigues 2006, Moreira 2006, Marques et al. 2011). However, there is 
still a long way to go in studying this subject. Current concerns about restoring 
investor confidence require greater transparency of financial reporting and 
reinforcement of the role of stakeholders in the corporate accountability 
process, which fits the role of the auditor. According to Choi et al. (2010), the 
quality of auditing is fundamental to the confidence of the capital market 
players and the economic development of countries. It is therefore important to 
analyze whether the audit is effective in detecting practices for manipulating 
the results and conveys them in the audit reports. 
The aim of this investigation is to study if there is a relationship between the 
manipulation of accounting results and audit quality in a group of Portuguese non-
listed companies. The intuition underlying the present study, according to the 
empirical evidence mentioned in developed countries, is that the size of the 
audit firm is clearly related to the quality of the audit, suggesting that larger 
audit firms provide higher quality (DeAngelo 1981, Zhou and Elder 2001, 
Bauwhede et al. 2003, Krishnan 2003, Yaşar 2013). An auditor who represents 
one of the four large audit firms, Big 4 (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers), is able to provide greater audits 
compared to smaller audit firms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section “Literature Review” 
reviews the prior literature on earnings management. Section “Methodology” 
describes the research methodology. Section “Results” presents our major findings 
and we conclude the paper with Section “Conclusions”. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Earnings Management 
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management takes place 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
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to modify financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. Thus, this definition 
points to management as the faction responsible for making those decisions 
that fall under the general management of earnings. But there are two weak 
points in this definition: it does not establish a distinct limit between earnings 
management and normal activities, the result of which is earnings; not all 
earnings management is deceptive.  
Ronen and Yaari (2011) define earnings management as a set of managerial 
decisions that result in not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing 
earnings as known to management. In their opinion, earnings management can 
be: Beneficial - it signals long-term value; Pernicious - it conceals short- or 
long-term value and Neutral - it reveals the short-term true performance. The 
managed earnings follow as the consequence of taking production/investment 
actions earlier than earnings are realized. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) also organize the different definitions of earnings 
management in three groups: white, gray or black. White earnings management – 
Beneficial - enhances the transparency of reports; Black earnings management – 
Pernicious - involves complete misrepresentation and fraud; Gray earnings 
management – Gray - includes manipulation of reports in the boundaries of 
compliance with bright-line standards, which could be either opportunistic or 
efficiency enhancing. 
There are also other authors that define white, gray and black earnings 
management. White earnings management takes advantage of flexibility in the 
choice of accounting treatments to signal the manager’s private information on 
future cash flows (Demski et al. 1984, Suh 1990, Demski 1998, Beneish 2001, 
Sankar and Subramanyam 2001). Gray earnings management chooses an 
accounting treatment that is either opportunistic or economically efficient (Fields 
et al. 2001, Scott 2006). Finally, black earnings management is the practice of 
using tricks to misrepresent or reduce the financial reports transparency (Levitt 
1998, Healy and Wahlen 1999, Chtourou and Bedard 2001). 
It seems easy to distinguish earnings management, but in reality it is hard 
since there are accounting transactions where ethical principles and value 
judgments are crucial in the decision to be taken. 
 
Earnings Management Measurement 
 
Many authors have used different methods in order to study why and how 
managers manipulate the results. It is not easy to recognize, identify and measure 
the earnings management (Dechow and Skinner 2000). Earnings management 
is typically studied using discretionary accruals (Ahmed et al. 2013). Quite a 
lot of authors consider that discretionary accruals manipulation is the most 
usual method of manipulation since it is less expensive and not easily identified 
by the market (Healy and Palepu, 1993). Furthermore, because of the subjective 
nature of the judgments involved, it is more difficult to audit (Spathis et al. 2002). 
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Usually, it is used the analysis of accruals when we are trying to detect 
evidence of manipulation, either in specific studies of earnings management 
(Jones, 1991), or when we are studying the quality of results (Burgstahler et al. 
2006). The model of Jones (1991) and the modified model of Jones proposed 
by Dechow et al. (1995) are the most used models in studies that apply the 
aggregate (Bartov et al. 2000, Davidson et al. 2005, Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006, Gore et al. 2007, Algharaballi and Albuloushi 2008, Jones et al. 2008, 
Rusmin 2010, Islam et al. 2011, Ecker et al. 2013). In this model accruals may 
be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
Even though quite a few models based on accruals had been developed, 
the solution initially proposed by Jones remains the basis of detection of 
earnings management. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Some studies (DeAngelo 1981, Becker et al. 1998, Francis et al. 1999) that 
analyze the quality of the audit, focus on the perspective that technical competence 
and degree of independence are characteristics that can be observed by the size 
of the company with incentives to maintain the number of clients and their 
reputation. Thus, a better quality audit is expected to be associated with lower 
levels of manipulation of results. In this way, it will be expected that specialized 
auditors representing reputable companies, particularly Big 4, tend to constrain 
the manipulation of results to a greater degree compared to lower quality 
auditors. The implicit idea of such a relationship is summarized in the following 
investigation hypothesis: 
H1: Portuguese non-listed companies audited by Big 4 are more likely to 
have lower levels of manipulation of results compared to companies audited by 
non-Big 4. 
The sample used in the present investigation consists of Portuguese non-
listed companies, whose financial statements were prepared according to the 
Accounting Standardization System (SNC) and audited in the scope of a statutory 
audit available in the SABI (Iberian Balance sheet Analysis System) database 
for the period between 2011 and 2013 (3 years), is composed by 4 723 companies, 
of 43 industry sectors (Table 1). The option for non-listed companies was 
supported by the approach to the Portuguese business fabric, composed essentially 
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), thus providing a greater number of 
data for analysis. 
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Table 1. Composition of the Sample by a Sector of Activity and Auditor Type 
Sectors of Activity 
Number of Observations 
Big 4 Auditor Non- Big 4 Total 
Agriculture, hunting, 
animal production 
22 3% 252 6% 274 6% 
Extraction industries 9 1% 57 1% 66 1% 
Manufacturing 272 34% 1618 41% 1890 40% 
Collection, treatment and distribution of 
water; sanitation, waste management and 
depollution 
77 10% 57 1% 134 3% 
Construction 53 7% 571 15% 624 13% 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles 
52 7% 213 5% 265 6% 
Transport and storage 66 8% 250 6% 316 7% 
Accommodation and catering 33 4% 262 7% 295 6% 
Information and communication activities 65 8% 150 4% 215 5% 
Consulting, scientific, technical activities 64 8% 291 7% 355 8% 
Education 3 0% 68 2% 71 2% 
Human health activities and social support 58 7% 107 3% 165 3% 
Artistic and sports activities 16 2% 37 1% 53 1% 
TOTAL 790 17% 3933 83% 4723 100% 
Source: Author, adapted from data from SABI 
 
Accrual based tests of earnings management are based on the following 
linear model: 
 
DAi,t = a + bPARTi,t + εi,t (1) 
  
where, 
 
DA = discretionary accruals; and 
PART = a dummy variable that is set to 1 in periods during which a 
hypothesized determinant of earnings management is present and 0 otherwise. 
 
The empirical model of this study consists of a multiple linear regression 
in order to explain the relationship between the dependent variable (explained) 
and the independent (explanatory) variables. The discretionary accruals (DA) 
are used as a dependent variable, and as independent variables the binary variable 
that defines whether the company is audited by a Big 4, the size of the company, 
the indebtedness, the turnover and the profitability. 
To test the research hypothesis, we estimate the following model, identified in 
equation (2), which connects the magnitude of the discretionary accruals with 
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the variable of interest, that is, the Big 4 binary variable and the other control 
variables: 
 
DA=β0+β1 Big 4 it +β2 DIM it +β3 END it +β4 CRES it +β5 REND it +ε it (2) 
 
where, 
 
Big 4 – Binary or dummy variable that has value "1" if a company is audited 
by a Big 4 and takes a value "0" otherwise. This variable allows differentiating 
the audit quality. 
According to DeAngelo (1981), Big 4 audit firms are more likely to conduct 
higher quality audits because they care about maintaining a good reputation in the 
market, and their auditors are sometimes subject to disciplinary sanctions. The 
authors (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008) also prove this argument, since they say 
that companies audited by a Big 4 have lower levels of manipulation of results, 
compared to companies that are not audited by a Big 4. According to Becker et al. 
(1998), it is expected that the variable "Big 4" will present a negative signal. 
 
DIM – Measures the size of the company, through the total asset logarithm. 
This variable is considered a determinant in the manipulation of results and in 
the level of accruals, because according to the studies carried out by Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2008) there is a relation between the dimension and the 
manipulation of results. Boone et al. (2010) concluded that the larger the size 
of companies, the lower the manipulation of results. Thus, the coefficient 
associated with this variable (β2) is expected to present a negative signal. 
 
END - This variable measures the company's level of indebtedness. It is 
calculated by the ratio of total liabilities to total net assets. 
This variable can influence the manipulation of results and therefore the quality 
of the results through two processes. On the one hand, the empirical evidence 
shows that the existence of high debts in companies with financial difficulties 
leads to a growing manipulation of results to avoid non-compliance with the 
constraints imposed by the financing agreements (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
2008). On the other hand, the debt is also a motivation for the quality of the 
audit, suggesting that for higher levels of indebtedness, there may be less 
tendency to manipulate results due to contractual renegotiations and because 
there is a greater control by creditor entities (Becker et al. 1998, Van Tendeloo 
& Vanstraelen 2008). Thus, considering the presence of forces of opposite 
direction, no expectation is expressed as to the expected signal for the 
coefficient of the variable "END" of the model (2). 
 
CRES - The variable "CRES" represents the annual percentage growth of sales 
consisting of the ratio between the annual variation of sales and the sales of 
year t-1. 
This variable intends to control differences in company performance. A sign of 
the positive coefficient of the variable "CRES" (β4) is expected, since this 
variable is expected to contribute to an increase in the manipulation of results 
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(Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008, Boone et al. 2010), which shows that 
companies with higher growth are encouraged to manipulate results. 
 
REND - Measures the operating return on assets (ROA) by the ratio of 
Operating Income and Net Assets Total, showing how the company's assets 
influence the match-fixing. 
This variable was shown to be significant in studies whose purpose is the 
quality of financial reporting. According to Tendeloo and Vanstraelen  (2008), 
this variable is also a way to control performance differences, according to 
these, the companies with greater profitability of the assets, are involved less in 
results management. 
There is evidence that companies with lower profitability availing match-fixing 
practices, with a view to providing a controlled decline of idea, which would 
not occur if there was a high variability of these performances, an increased 
risk and loss of confidence in the management. Thus, it is expected that the 
companies with higher operating profitability of the assets, have a lower 
incentive to manipulate results, and therefore we predict a negative relation 
with this practice. 
 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
In order to characterize our sample, this section will analyze and comment 
on the descriptive statistics of the sample. For the accomplishment of the 
statistical tests and of the regressions was used the program IBM SPSS 
Statistics 21. To verify the assumption of normality, as we are dealing with a 
large sample, N = 4723, by the central limit theorem we can assume that 
violation of this assumption does not call into question the study. Some 
descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample  
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation 
DA 4723 0,052713 0,046562 0,034287 
DIM 4723 6,831057 6,789632 0,636458 
END 4723 0,663901 0,676888 0,178933 
CRES 4723 0,015177 0,002985 0,126065 
REND 4723 0,028632 0,027925 0,110089 
Source: Author, adapted from data from SABI 
 
From the analysis of the descriptive statistics measures we highlight the 
following aspects: 
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- The quality measure of discretionary accruals "DA" of the companies 
that compose our sample takes on average the value of 0.053, median 
the value of 0.047 and standard deviation 0.034. These values do not 
present great differences, which demonstrate a normal distribution of 
the sample, evidencing non-dispersion of the data. 
- In average terms, the companies have a level of indebtedness (END) of 
around 66.4%, annual sales growth (CRES) of 1.5% and a REND of 
close to 3%. 
- We can observe that the variables "DIM" and "CRES", have the highest 
and lowest value, respectively, relative to the average value. 
 
Some of its statistical characteristics will also be discussed, in particular, 
the absence of multicollinearity between the variables, that is, the lack of 
correlation between the variables of the model under study. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients will be presented for the variables of the model under 
study. Table 3 shows the correlation between the variables of the multivariate 
model defined for our study. Through Pearson's correlation coefficients, we 
can analyze the correlations between the different variables of the model. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Big 4 DA DIM END CRES REND 
Big 4 1 
     DA 0,083 1 
    DIM 0,194 -0,057 1 
   END -0,001 -0,048 -0,036 1 
  CRES -0,035 0,061 -0,102 0,103 1 
 REND 0,047 0,086 -0,104 -0,242 0,101 1 
Source: Author, adapted from data from SABI 
 
According to Gujarati (2004), a correlation coefficient between two variables 
that in absolute value is superior to 0,8, reveals the existence of serious 
problems of multicollinearity. However, this criterion should be used carefully 
and weighted for each specific case, usually conservatively, values greater than 
0.4 will be avoided. 
By the observation of the coefficients presented in Table 3, they suggest a 
low multicollinearity among the variables of the model under analysis, since 
the correlation coefficients present low values, removing the hypothesis of 
existence of multicollinearity problems in the estimation of the model. Thus, in 
general, it can be said that all variables have a weak correlation with each other. 
The higher correlation (approximately -0.242), between the "END" and "REND" 
variables, suggests that more indebted companies have lower profitability levels. 
The dependent variable "DA" is significantly and positively correlated with 
the variables "Big 4", "CRES" and "REND" and negatively with the variables 
"Dimension" and "END". These results suggest that companies audited by a Big 4, 
with a higher level of sales growth and greater profitability, smaller and less 
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indebted, are associated with a greater magnitude of the discretionary accruals and 
as such to a bigger manipulation of results. 
All variables present statistically significant correlations, except for the 
correlation between Big 4 and NDT, which was not statistically significant. 
Next, we will analyze the empirical evidence obtained with the estimation of the 
model under study. Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the model 
(equation (2)). This is statistically significant, and its explanatory power has an 
adjusted R
2
 of 24.3%. 
It can be verified that the generality of the variables presents coefficients with 
the signal concordant with the expectations discussed. 
 
Table 4. Results of the Regression Model 
Variables Expected Signal Coefficient P-Value 
Constant 
 
0,041 0,000 
Big 4 - -0,001 0,000 
DIM - -0,002 0,000 
END ? 0,003 0,132 
CRES + 0,024 0,000 
REND - 0,001 0,004 
Observations         4723 
 
F test          0,000  
Adjusted R
2
          0,243 
 
Source: Author, adapted from data from SABI 
 
Let us now analyze in more detail all the variables and their impact on the 
explanation of discretionary accruals. 
The variable "Big 4" is statistically significant to explain the behavior of 
discretionary accruals (p-value =, 000) with its coefficient of -0.001, which 
means that Big 4 audits work as a constraint to the manipulation of results. The 
expected coefficient of -0.001 for the variable "Big 4" means that the 
magnitude of the discretionary accruals decreases by 0.1% if the Big 4 value 
grows from 0 to 1. That is, if it is audited by a non Big 4 company, the variable 
"DA" has the approximate average value of 0.041, if audited by a Big 4 
assumes the value 0.041-0.001. The value for this coefficient is consistent with 
those obtained in the literature (Becker et al. 1998, Francis et al. 1999). 
The "DIM" variable has a coefficient of -0.002 and is statistically significant 
(p-value =, 000), which means that the larger the company size the lower its 
level of results manipulation, thus presenting a better quality of the financial 
report. Our result is consistent with those obtained by (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
2008) and (Boone et al. 2010), both found a negative association between the 
size of the company and the manipulation of results. 
The variable "END" presents a coefficient of 0.003 and is not statistically 
significant (p-value =, 132), thus observing the assumption that the levels of 
indebtedness would be one of the main motivations for the manipulation of 
results. The sign of the coefficient of this variable reflects the idea that the 
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higher the level of indebtedness of the company, the greater the concern of the 
company to present results that allow more favorable contractual conditions 
(Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008, Becker et al. 1998). 
The variable "CRES" is statistically significant (p-value =, 000) and with a 
coefficient of 0.024, suggesting that companies with higher growth lead to 
greater practice of manipulation of results. This study is in line with what was 
expected (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008, Boone et al. 2010). 
The variable "REND" is significant (p-value =, 004) with a coefficient of 
0.001, which indicates that the operating profitability of the assets is positively 
associated with discretionary accruals. Thus, the 1% variation in the operating 
profitability of the assets results in a variation of -0.001 in the absolute value of 
the discretionary accruals. The sign of this variable is contrary to expectations. 
It is not consistent with other studies that concern the quality of financial 
reporting, such as that done by Romanus et al. (2008). We can thus conclude 
that the control variables are all statistically significant except for the variable 
"END" (p-value = 0.132). According to these results, nothing tells us that 
levels of indebtedness can be associated with the level of quality of the results 
of the companies under analysis. 
The adjusted R² value, presented in Table 4, indicates that the discretionary 
accruals (DA) variation can be explained in around 24.3% around its mean by 
the independent variables inserted in the model. It is set aside, since the p-value 
of the F-statistic (p-value = 0.000) is lower than all the usual levels of 
significance (1%, 5%, 10%), which means that the model is valid for explaining 
the variation in the quality of discretionary accruals. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this empirical study the objective was to analyze the existence of a 
relationship between the manipulation of results and the quality of the audit in 
Portuguese non-listed companies, because it is an issue that has not yet been 
explored in this type of companies. For this, we used the methodological 
construction derived from the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model, which 
reprocessed the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models and the 
association between adjustments resulting from the accrual basis and the cash 
flow (Ball and Shivakumar 2005), adding independent variables as proxies for 
economic losses, establishing several assumptions. 
Based on a sample of 4 723 Portuguese non-listed companies, withdrawn 
from the SABI database between 2011 and 2013, comprising 790 companies 
audited by a Big 4 (17% of the total sample) and 3933 companies audited by a 
non-Big 4 (83 % of the total sample), it was tested whether firms audited by 
Big 4 are more likely to have lower levels of manipulation of results than firms 
audited by non-Big 4s. 
The empirical evidence obtained corroborated the hypothesis formulated. 
The main empirical results show a relationship between the manipulation of 
results and the quality of the audit, suggesting that companies audited by a Big 
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4 have a lower degree of manipulation of results than companies that are 
audited by a non-Big 4. Our results are consistent with the results obtained by 
others (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008, Boone et al. 2010), where they 
concluded that in countries with low fiscal alignment, companies audited by a 
Big 4 firm are more involved in manipulating results when compared to 
companies audited by a non-Big 4. 
We also conclude that companies audited by a Big 4 firm, with higher 
levels of annual sales growth and higher profitability and smaller and less 
indebted, are associated with a greater magnitude of discretionary accruals and, 
as such, more manipulation of results. This study also reveals that the larger the 
size of unlisted companies, the greater the practice of results management in 
order to increase them. On the other hand, in the presence of low profits, 
companies show a lower tendency to practice results management and evidence 
to manage more the results in the direction of their increase. 
This research is particularly relevant from the point of view of academic 
research because it is applied to the Portuguese context and contributes to the 
literature on the manipulation of results and its relation to the quality of the 
audit. 
 
 
References 
 
Ahmed K, Chalmers K, Khlif H (2013) A Meta-analysis of IFRS adoption effects. 
International Journal of Accounting 48(2): 173–217. doi: 10.1016/j.intacc.2013. 
04.002. 
Al-Rassas AH, Kamardin H (2016) Earnings quality and audit attributes in high 
concentrated ownership market. Corporate Governance: The international journal of 
business in society 16(2): 377–399. doi: 10.1108/CG-08-2015-0110. 
Algharaballi E, Albuloushi S (2008) Evaluating the specification and power of 
discretionary accruals models in Kuwait. Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds 
14(3/4): 251–264. doi: 10.1057/jdhf.2008.23. 
Ball R, Shivakumar L (2005) Earnings quality in UK private firms: Comparative loss 
recognition timeliness, Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1): 83–128. doi: 
10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.04.001. 
Ball R, Shivakumar L (2006) The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss 
recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 44(2): 207–242. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
679X.2006.00198.x. 
Bartov E, Gul FA, Tsui JSL (2000) Discretionary-accruals models and audit 
qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30(3): 421–452. doi: 10.1016/ 
S0165-4101(01)00015-5. 
Bauwhede H, Willekens M, Gaeremynck A (2003) Audit firm size, public ownership, and 
firms’ discretionary accruals management. International Journal of Accounting 
38(1): 1–22. doi: 10.1016/S0020-7063(03)00004-9. 
Becker CL et al. (1998) The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 15(1): 1–24. doi: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb 
00547.x. 
Bekiris FV, Doukakis LC (2011) Corporate Governance and Accruals Earnings 
Management. Managerial and Decision Economics 32(7): 439–456. doi: 10.1002/ 
mde.1541. 
Vol. 4, No. 2        Lopes: Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Portugal 
                           
190 
Beneish MD (2001) Earnings management: a perspective. Managerial Finance 27(12): 3–
17. doi: 10.1108/03074350110767411. 
Bergstresser D, Philippon T (2006) CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Economics 80(3): 511–529. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011. 
Boone JP, Khurana IK, Raman KK (2010) Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide 
audits of similar quality ? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29(4): 330–352. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.06.007. 
Burgstahler DC et al (2006) The Importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings 
Management in European Private and The Importance of Reporting Incentives: 
Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms. Source: The 
Accounting Review, 81(5): 983–1016. doi: 10.2308/accr.2006.81.5.983. 
Choi JH et al (2010) Audit office size, audit quality, and audit pricing. Auditing, 29(1): 
73–97. doi: 10.2308/aud.2010.29.1.73. 
Chtourou SM, Bedard J (2001) Corporate Governance and Earnings Management. Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN) 4(418): 1–39. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.275053. 
Davidson R, Goodwin-Stewart J, Kent P (2005) Internal governance structures and 
earnings management. Accounting and Finance 45(2): 241–267. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
629x.2004.00132.x. 
DeAngelo LE (1981) Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 3(3):  183–199. doi: 10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1. 
Dechow PM, Dichev ID (2002) The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors. Accounting Review  77: 35–59. doi: 10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.61. 
Dechow PM, Skinner DJ (2000) Earnings management: Reconciling the views of 
accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14(2): 
235–250. doi: 10.2308/acch.2000.14.2.235. 
Dechow PM, Sloan RG, Sweeney AP (1995) Detecting Earnings Management. The 
Accounting Review 70(2): 193–225. doi: 10.2307/248303. 
Demski JS (1998) Performance Measure Manipulation. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 15(3): 261–285. doi: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00560.x. 
Demski JS, Patell JM, Wolfson Ma (1984) Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems. 
Accounting Review 59(1): 16–34. Retrieved from: http://bit.ly/2jzNWtd. 
Ecker F et al. (2013) Estimation sample selection for discretionary accruals models. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(2–3): 190–211. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco. 
2013.07.001. 
Fields TD, Lys TZ, Vincent L (2001) Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 31(1–3): 255–307. doi: 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00028-3. 
Francis JR, Maydew EL, Sparks HC (1999) The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals. Auditing 18(2): 17–34. doi: 10.2308/aud.1999.18.2.17. 
Gore P, Pope PF, Singh AK (2007) Earnings management and the distribution of earnings 
relative to targets: UK evidence. Accounting and Business Research 37(2): 123–
129,134,136,138. doi: 10.1080/00014788.2007.9730065. 
Gujarati DN (2004) Basic Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill Education. doi: 
10.1126/science.1186874. 
Healy PM, Palepu K. G (1993) The Effect of Firms’ Financial Disclosure Strategies on 
Stock Prices. Accounting Horizons 7(1): 1–11. 
Healy PM, Wahlen, JM (1999) A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4): 365–383. doi: 10.2308/ 
acch.1999.13.4.365. 
Hsu MF, Wen SY (2015) The Influence of Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies 
on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management. Asian Economic and 
Financial Review 5(3):  391–406. doi: 10.18488/journal.aefr/2015.5.3/102.3.391.406. 
Athens Journal of Business and Economics April 2018 
             
191 
Islam MA, Ali R, Ahmad Z (2011) Is Modified Jones Model Effective in Detecting 
Earnings Management? Evidence from A Developing Economy. International 
Journal of Economics and Finance 3(2). doi: 10.5539/ijef.v3n2p116. 
Jones JJ (1991) Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29(2): 193. doi: 10.2307/2491047. 
Jones KL, Krishnan GV, Melendrez KD (2008) Do Models of Discretionary Accruals 
Detect Actual Cases of Fraudulent and Restated Earnings? An Empirical Analysis. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 25(2): 499–531. doi: 10.1506/car.25.2.8. 
Krishnan GV (2003) Does big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings 
management? Accounting Horizons (1–16). doi: 10.2308/acch.2003.17.s-1.1. 
Levitt A (1998) The Numbers Game. Remarks by Chairman Arthur Levitt at the NYU 
Center for Law and Business. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
Marques M, Rodrigues LL, Craig R (2011) Earnings management induced by tax 
planning: The case of Portuguese private firms. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation 20(2): 83–96. doi: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2011.06.003. 
Mendes C, Rodrigues L (2006) Estudo de práticas de earnings management nas empresas 
portuguesas cotadas em bolsa : Identificação de alisamento de resultados e seus 
factores explicativos. Revista de Estudos Politécnicos 145–173. 
Moreira JAC (2006) Manipulação para evitar perdas: o impacto do conservantismo. 
Contabilidade e Gestão, Revista Cientifica da Câmara 3: 33–63. Retrieved from: 
http://bit.ly/2BE6YWC. 
Romanus RN, Maher JJ, Fleming DM (2008) Auditor industry specialization, auditor 
changes, and accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons 22(4): 389–413. doi: 
10.2308/acch.2008.22.4.389. 
Ronen J, Yaari V (2008) Earnings Management: Emerging Insights in Theory, Practice, 
and Research. New York: Springer. ISBN 978-0-387-25769-3. 
Ronen J, Yaari V (2011) Earnings management: Emerging insights in theory, practice and 
research. The international Journal of accounting 46(2): 236–237. doi: 10.1007/978-
0-387-25771-6. 
Rusmin R (2010) Auditor quality and earnings management: Singaporean evidence. 
Managerial Auditing Journal 25(7): 618–638. doi: 10.1108/02686901011061324. 
Sankar MR, Subramanyam KR (2001) Reporting discretion and private information 
communication through earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 39(2): 365–386. 
doi: 10.2307/2672961. 
Scott WR (2006) Financial Accounting Theory. Learning p. 546. Available at: http:// 
books.google.com/books?id=76epLQAACAAJ&pgis=1. 
Spathis C, Doumpos M, Zopounidis C (2002) Detecting falsified financial statements: a 
comparative study using multicriteria analysis and multivariate statistical techniques. 
European Accounting Review 11(3): 509–535. doi: 10.1080/0963818022000000966. 
Suh YS (1990) Communication and Income Smoothing Through Accounting Method 
Choice.  Management Science 36(6): 704–723. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.36.6.704. 
Tendeloo B, Vanstraelen A (2008) Earnings management and audit quality in Europe: 
Evidence from the private client segment market. European Accounting Review 
17(3): 447–469. doi: 10.1080/09638180802016684. 
Tsipouridou M, Spathis C (2012) Earnings management and the role of auditors in an 
unusual IFRS context: The case of Greece. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation 21(1): 62–78. doi: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2012.01.005. 
Yaşar A (2013) Big four auditors’ audit quality and earnings management: Evidence from 
Turkish stock market. International Journal of Business and Social Science 4(17): 
154–163. 
Vol. 4, No. 2        Lopes: Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Portugal 
                           
192 
Zhou J, Elder R (2001) Audit Firm Size, Industry Specialization and Earnings 
Management by Initial Public Offering Firms. State University of New York at 
Binghamton (315). 
 
 
